Europeans on strength, but only 1,065 deaths from among the more than 100,000 sepoys.2 Therefore the British directed a good deal of attention to those diseases thought most threatening to the European rank and file, particularly cholera, malaria, and dysentery. This being the case, it is not surprising that these diseases have been the subject of some very important recent works on the history of colonial medicine.3 Yet if we extend our
gaze beyond the army's mortality rates, and take morbidity into account, we find that sexually-transmitted diseases (syphilis, gonorrhoea, and a range of undiagnosed penile chancres) were constantly threatening to deprive the British of many of their rank and file. With upwards of 30 per cent of the European soldiers in India in hospital with venereal complaints at any time, a reduction in venereal diseases became a strategic as well as a medical imperative. Regimental hospitals of the Bengal army in the 1820s and 1830s treated approximately 2,400 venereal cases each year, and this was in an army which had an average establishment of only about 8,500 Europeans. Hence, venereal diseases became a strategic as well as a medical imperative.4 Moreover, medical and military spokesmen often pointed to the correlation between venereal diseases and other health and discipline problems. Troops searching for sexual gratification were lured away from the safe confines of the barracks where the military could exert some control over them and into local communities where the army's powers of surveillance were greatly circumscribed. There, soldiers were exposed to a range of temptations threatening to military discipline as well as to the troops' own physical well-being. This paper will examine early nineteenth-century debates in India over how best to combat venereal afflictions in the British and Company armies. In the absence of an effective clinical treatment for these diseases, prevention seemed the only course of action. However, owing to contemporary ideas of masculinity as well as the constructions of Indian society that were then taking shape, the obvious route of intervening directly in the soldiers' sexual activity was never thought to be a viable option save by a few medical and military officers. The rest were convinced that their soldiers were not only personally incapable of curbing their sexual desires, but also that any attempt by their officers to do so for them might undermine their heterosexuality which the army prized so highly. Masculinity had become an important prism through which colonial societies could be observed and ranked. The difference between the conquering European and conquered Indian were often presented in starkly gendered terms. The manliness of the European conqueror was set against the fickle and effeminate Indian male.5 Although not all Indian males were typecast the same (the Bengalis for example were singled out as the most effeminate, while Sikhs were credited with being more masculine), a clear line was laid down between Europeans and Indians. To maintain such a hierarchy required that nothing be done that could raise uncertainties about the European male and so the soldier was left alone.
It is no surprise that attention then turned to those viewed as the principal carriers of the disease-the prostitutes of the cantonment.6 Various schemes of mandatory inspection 4I need at this point to make an important 1784-1898, New York, Oxford University Press, disclaimer. Venereal diseases will be used here in its 1986, p. 191.
nineteenth-century sense, that is as a generic term for 5 The relationship between masculinity and those diseases which contemporaries primarily imperialism in India is the subject of Mrinalini identified on the grounds of their being sexually Sinha, Colonial masculinity: the 'manly Englishman' transmitted. These would include what today we and the 'effeminate Bengali' in the late nineteenth would identify as syphilis, gonorrhoea and a range of century, Manchester University Press, 1995.
penile chancres. By way of comparison, rates of 6 It is much to be regretted that all my diggings in venereal diseases in the United States army at this the archives have failed so far to recover the voices time were much lower, averaging around 6 per cent of those Indian women affected by policies aimed at between 1829 and 1838 and only rising to 7 per cent combating venereal disease, at least for the first half in the 1840s. Edward M Coffman, The old army: a of the nineteenth century. I can only hope that further portrait of the American army in peacetime, research will fill in this lacunae.
accompanied by the enforced treatment of those labelled as diseased were devised, frequently critiqued, sometimes rejected, and often modified in India between 1805 and 1860, and these would serve as the prototypes for the more famous Contagious Diseases Acts of the later nineteenth century.7 Between 1805 and 1833, lock hospitals for the forcible confinement of women suspected of venereal infection were established at most cantonments, in which were housed the some 26,000 European soldiers normally stationed in India. Interestingly, and in contrast to the situation later in the century, their introduction did not cause much debate. Support for lock hospitals was initially greatest amongst army officers, who sought to stem the flow of soldiers seeking medical treatment for venereal infections. By the 1830s, military officers were joined by many surgeons who had also come to view the lock hospital as a necessary and possibly unique solution to the problem of venereal diseases. Yet in 1833 the system of lock hospitals, which had hitherto enjoyed wide support from the Anglo-Indian military, medical and civilian communities in India, as well as from the East India Company's Court of Directors in London, suddenly came under attack from the Governor General. William Bentinck (Governor General 1828-1835), armed with a lengthy condemnation of lock hospitals written for him by the Inspector General of His Majesty's Hospitals in Bengal, ordered their closure. This directive triggered a great deal of discussion, much of it quite acrimonious, and it is from these debates that we can begin to reconstruct some of the military, medical and moral agendas, and their transformations, which so powerfully shaped colonial rule in India. British medical and military officers in India were white, male and middle-if not upperclass; gender and race set them apart from the Indian prostitutes, while class distinguished them from the rank and file. Consequently, questions of race, gender and class all came into play whenever the army looked to control venereal diseases within its ranks.
Detection and Diagnosis of the Problem Venereal diseases and the British army of the nineteenth century were for many contemporaries almost synonymous. It was an army of mostly single males who were signed up for stretches of up to twenty years in a society which placed great stress on the assertion of masculine traits, and which had few recreational outlets beyond the bottle or 7 There is extensive literature available on the Contagious Diseases Acts, particularly on 
Medical Interventions and the Imperial Milieu
The most common treatment for syphilis at this time was mercury. Syphilis was often attributed to an especially virulent poison which had entered the patient. The poison needed to be driven out of the body, and, because it was so elusive (as proven by its ability to lodge itself in all places of the body), strong medicine was required. Mercury fitted this requirement perfectly: its powerful effects were attested by the salivation and perspiration which were taken as signs that the poison was being forced out of the body. Moreover, given the moral stigma attached to venereal disease, the patient was often expected to endure some suffering or penance during the cure. The brutal effects of mercury certainly satisfied this expectation. Mercury was administered to the patient in three basic ways, orally in the shape of what were colloquially known as "blue pills" (a mixture of mercury, confection of roses and powdered licorice), as an ointment (referred to as applied by "friction" in contemporary texts), and finally, and less commonly, as mercury vapours.31
While we find that mercury was also used to treat gonorrhoea, this practice was not nearly so widespread. Instead, leeches, silver nitrate washes and other caustic solutions were applied to the immediately affected area.
Opposition to the use of mercury in treating syphilis was, however, growing in the early nineteenth century, particularly within the ranks of the army's medical service. George Ballingall, who became professor of military surgery at the University of Edinburgh, surveyed surgeons in a number of stations and, based on their reports, he questioned the efficacy of mercury. He expounded on these views in several textbooks, which became standard reading for many surgeons in the army. the period of mercurial mania, how common an event was destruction of the nasal and palatine bones; and men who were then said to have suffered in the wars of Venus, probably suffered more from the wars of Mercury."34 Mercury's opponents rested their case in part on the idea, also common in France at this time, that syphilis was primarily a disease of inflammation, and therefore it required an antiphlogistic regime of diet, enemas, laxatives, and occasionally bleeding to counteract the irritation of the inflamed membranes. But there was also a uniquely Indian side to this anti-mercurial position, and one that related to what its proponents saw as the peculiarly hostile effects of the Indian environment on the European constitution. As Mark Harrison has noted, colonial medical practices did not simply mimic metropolitan medicine.35 Medical thought on the colonial periphery was heavily weighted in favour of environmental influences, and diseases were often presented as having characteristics which differed according to the part of the world in which they were experienced. As one surgeon explained, "in tropical regions, disease is of the most acute kind and rapid in its progress".36 The author then concluded that, despite its initial ferocity, secondary or constitutional syphilis was less of a concern because hot climate diseases do not produce the same chronic conditions found in other climates. Such views can be dated to at least the seventeenth century, for the French surgeon and traveller, Fran,ois Bernier, had made the same claim.37 It was for these stages of the disease that mercury was most commonly prescribed. Paradoxically, those who favoured mercury could also build a case on environmentalist arguments. In particular, some of them believed that penile chancres were especially tenacious in India, and so there was more of a need for mercury to attack these symptoms at their first manifestation.38
Not all surgeons in India subscribed to the anti-mercurialists' position, and consequently venereal treatments tended to vary between hospitals as regimental surgeons were left free to employ whatever therapy they thought best suited to the case at hand. Nor can surgeons be conveniently lumped into those who used mercury and those who did not. Many army surgeons in India opposed the blanket adoption of mercury in all cases, and called instead for its selective deployment. They insisted that a distinction should be drawn between simple syphilis and complicated syphilis (or primary and secondary syphilis): only the latter required mercury. Simple syphilis, which they argued was more common in the army, was better treated without mercury for in such cases the cure, that is heavy metal poisoning, was believed to be ultimately more harmful than the disease.39 Proponents of mercury, even the half-hearted ones, could also build their case on pragmatic grounds. They emphasized that non-mercurial treatments required a much longer stay in hospital. Soldiers would therefore be taken out of active service for longer stretches of time of disease transmission, and the fact that venereal diseases in India were so deeply entangled with questions of race and gender (the "victims" were commonly presented as white and male, the "perpetrator", that is the prostitutes, as Indian and female), discussions about how to try and interdict transmission of the disease ranged well beyond narrow epidemiological and clinical boundaries. The production of an official position on sexuality, and its subsequent regulation, was crucial to imperial efforts to police the various hierarchies which sustained the imperial project, namely hierarchies of race, gender, and class.41 The health of the European troops became a critical venue for rehearsing these positions.
By the late nineteenth century, the soldiers who contracted a venereal disease were often portrayed as victims-innocents seduced by crafty and amoral Indian prostitutes.42 Such representations are fully in keeping with the iconography of venereal diseases. Sander Gilman's work on nineteenth-century depictions of such diseases has pointed to the common practice of playing up the maleness of the sufferer, for "he is the incidental victim of the female's infection".43 The emphasis that this iconography placed on gender meant that it was particularly well attuned to the hyper-masculine culture which prevailed in the army. European troops were not only commonly viewed as the ultimate foundation of colonial rule, but their sexual activity comprised the biggest and most obvious zone of sexual contact between European males and indigenous females. Hence, debates on how best to deal with venereal diseases in the Indian and British armies offered an ideal opportunity for demarcating between colonizer and colonized, male and female, and the various possible permutations and combinations which stemmed from these categories. Differences were identified and articulated using sexual criteria. We In Britain, many social reformers, evangelicals and members of the middle classes were outraged at the sins around them. Apprehensions about the moral and physical consequences of venereal diseases persuaded a number of doctors, philanthropists and local officials that something had to be done.44 Venereal diseases could no longer be tolerated. Armed with an increasing array of statistics and in an era of mounting interest in sanitation and in social engineering, sanitary and moral reformers tried to combat venereal diseases. Therefore, it is no accident that the campaign to control venereal diseases through the introduction of lock hospitals in India coincided with the opening of a number of lock hospitals in Britain: Glasgow (1805), Newcastle (1813), Manchester (1819), Liverpool (1834), and Leeds (1842).45 However, it must be noted that in Britain these hospitals lacked the blatantly coercive character of their counterparts in India. Moreover, lock hospitals in Britain directed their efforts not only at curing the disease, but also at dealing with the moral failings which it was felt had led the patient to contract the disease in the first place.46 In India, while similar moral positions were occasionally articulated, demands for sanitation and regulation were not normally set in the rhetoric of reform. Instead, as we shall see, the rhetoric of reform was taken up by opponents of lock hospitals.
Class-based prejudices also came into play. Officers viewed European soldiers as beyond moral redemption. Most officers and surgeons would have agreed with Wellington's famous dictum that the British soldier was the "scum of the earth". Not only was the soldier thought to be ruled by his baser instincts, but any attempt to meddle with these could have unfortunate consequences for the British army. Sexual activity not only vented the soldier's frustrations, it served to prove his masculinity, a demonstration of great symbolic weight given that masculinity assisted the British in distinguishing between themselves as manly conquerors and many Indian males typecast as effete and effeminate. For many officers this ruled out the possibility that venereal diseases could be checked by appealing to the soldier's morality. There was also a lurking fear that should these soldiers not be given the opportunity to vent their baser instincts, even worse consequences might arise: more violence in the barracks, more desertion, and increased alcoholism; and most unsettling of all was the unspoken fear of homosexuality.47
Not all surgeons however shared this bleak prognosis of the soldier's character. There were some who called their medical colleagues to task for failing to consider that pernicious moral influences might be as threatening to the soldier's health as the local environment was widely believed to be: "I am strongly of opinion that too low a view has been taken of the 44 prostitute can be partly accounted for by contemporary readings of caste and occupation which gave priority to hereditary explanations, and partly by the increasing use of sexuality and gender as important means of establishing a moral and cultural hierarchy in which Europeans ranked above Indians. As Levine has pointed out, the mere existence of a prostitute "caste" (into which were folded commercial prostitutes as well as courtesans and temple dancers) was useful proof to the British ofjust how debased Indian society had become.54 Closely coupled to this construction of the Indian prostitute was the more general idea that Indian women were inherently less able to control their sexuality, proof of just how far their environment and society had frustrated any chances of moral regeneration from within. Once again medical proof was forthcoming to bolster these assertions. "The women's diseases, we know and hear little of; but, as strictly sexual, we may infer, from their early marriages, that they will be more the diseases of debility and relaxation (diseased mammae and ovaria), than those of an opposite nature to which the female is prone in European countries."55 The argument that Indian prostitutes would accept genital examination with nonchalance was advanced as further proof of the degraded nature of Indian women.56 Such representations of Indian women, which undercut their claims to a common humanity, prepared the groundwork for others who would defend the use of "a little wholesome coercion" to combat venereal diseases in India.57
Other commentators tied the rise and fall of venereal disease to agrarian conditions and thus embedded prostitution in the social and economic structures of the sub-continent. They argued that in times of famine, the number of women around stations increased, and with it venereal disease became more common. One surgeon serving in the Madras Presidency calculated the rates of infection over a seventeen year period, and showed that the rate was highest in years of dearth. The average for the 13th Dragoons was forty cases per year, but in 1824-25 and 1833-34 (both periods of famine) the number topped one hundred. In those years, "the poor and half starved villagers have been known to cohabitate with the men of our regiment for a handful of grain."58 The suggestion that prostitution in India might be a rational act by women faced with a dismal choice between starvation or sexual labour, strengthened criticisms of Indian society for its allegedly poor treatment of women, as well as the argument that intervention from outside was needed for there was little hope of change from within.
Systematic attempts to combat venereal disease by seeking out and treating the women accused of carrying it had become a popular option among many officers by the end of the eighteenth century. There was no official policy at that time, nor were such efforts officially sanctioned, but officers were nevertheless beginning to experiment with various regulatory schemes. Samuel Hickson, a soldier in the East India Company's army, wrote in the 1780s that in Bombay a committee of surgeons would regularly inspect the women of the bazaar, and forcibly detain for treatment any that were found to be infected.59 In the early nineteenth century, it was reported that in many cantonments, "it is customary to appoint a committee every month . . . for the inspection of such dulcineas as may be resident within the bounds of the cantonments: such as appear to be diseased, are instantly confined to a small hospital". This method was reckoned by the author to be superior to what were then known as lock hospitals, which at that time "only offers, but does not coerce to, a proper course of medicine."60 In other instances commanding officers pursued an even more aggressive strategy. George Ballingall recounted that, early in the nineteenth century, the commanding officer of H.M. 2nd Regiment sent a surprise patrol through the cantonment one evening. All unmarried women were rounded up and subjected to a medical examination the following morning. Those that were clean were issued a certificate allowing them free movement in the cantonment; those that were diseased "were drummed out of the fort, after having their heads shaved and whitewashed, a mark of disgrace which was for a time indelible, and was a sufficient beacon to cause them to be shunned.",61 Ballingall voiced by later opponents. Critics pointed to the "difficulty of imposing the necessary restraint on the females admitted", and to the "impolicy of resorting to any mode of compulsion", the "aversion of the natives to our mode of treatment", and "above all to the difficulty and uncertainty of effecting cures with unwilling patients."67 Such objections were overruled on the grounds of military necessity, and by the mid-1820s, all the major stations of the British army in India were equipped with lock hospitals which were placed under the control of the garrison's senior surgeon. By 1822 the lock hospitals at the major stations of the Bengal army collectively treated over 4,000 women a year for venereal diseases.68 In 1828, the figure had climbed to 4,830 women treated at a total cost of Rs 34,383.69 By then there were a total of sixteen lock hospitals in Bengal. Lock hospitals in Bombay were also busy; it was reported that the peons attached to the hospital in Pune daily brought in twenty women for inspection.70 One surgeon described the methods used:
[I] inspected the public women without determining any fixed period, but whenever any suspicions had arisen of a diseased woman being in the bazar-as these inspections were always ordered on a sudden, it has had the best effect, as it prevented precautions being taken by these people to prevent their disorders being detected which they used to do when they knew the precise time they would be sent for.71
The day-to-day running of the lock hospital was entrusted to a matron, who was assisted by a small staff. There were several peons, usually no more than four, whose duties included the apprehension of diseased or allegedly diseased women and standing guard at the hospital to prevent escapes. Sweepers and other domestics were employed to tend to the inmates' needs. Funding for these hospitals was normally calculated by a combination of a set amount for facilities and a per capita fee for every woman treated.
William Bentinck and the Case against the Lock Hospitals
The experiment with lock hospitals ended in 1830 when the government of Bengal ordered their abolition in that presidency. Bentinck then appealed to Madras reservations expressed by those military officers he had canvassed, and his general order that prohibited corporal punishment on Indian sepoys was again undertaken against widespread opposition from within the army.76 Bentinck was, moreover, a strong believer in the application of scientific methods of enquiry to the practice of government, and he thus proved to be particularly susceptible to statistical data.
Bentinck recoiled at the compulsion used in lock hospitals, for it offended his deeplyrooted reformist sentiments. He was somewhat ahead of his time in looking towards improving the conditions, and hence the moral standing, of his colonial subjects, and his paternalistic gaze extended to include the European soldier as well as the Indian prostitute. Lock hospitals were at best a short-term solution: they did nothing for the prostitute, and only indirectly checked the spread of infection amongst the troops. An improvement in the moral condition of the European rank and file, he believed, through offering better and more uplifting diversions (such as libraries, coffee houses, gardens, sports grounds), would bring the rate of infection down. Furthermore, he argued that once the advantages 75 The term "administrative generalship" was Madras army, and Bentinck not only never recovered coined by John Rosselli in his Lord William from the ignominy of recall, he also thereafter Bentinck. Bentinck's intense suspicions of the harboured suspicions that military officers were military establishment, even when he himself held doing things behind his back. See Rosselli, op. cit., the rank of general, can be traced back to the Vellore note 63 above, pp. of western medicine became more widely known, local women would come willingly for treatment, and not only for venereal diseases, but other complaints as well. By separating medical treatment from the coercive apparatus of the state, Bentinck hoped that the modernization of India would be accelerated as Indians began to accept voluntarily the benefits of western science and knowledge. Bentinck's opposition to lock hospitals was strengthened in 1832 when he had William Burke, Inspector General of H.M. Hospitals in Bengal, prepare a detailed memorandum on the costs and efficiency of lock hospitals. Burke's critique of them was a surprising volte-face, for only five years before he had argued with equal vehemence that they were essential to the health of the European rank and file.77 Among the measures he then recommended were the compulsory registering of all prostitutes, and the requirement that they submit themselves for examination every other week. Those that failed to do so were to be either punished or forcibly confined.78
Burke completely reversed his position in 1832. He dismissed lock hospitals, arguing that they not only failed to curb venereal diseases, but actually encouraged their spread.79 He claimed that when lock hospitals were common in the 1 820s, on average one in every three European soldiers was being treated for venereal disease at any time. After 1830 the rate dropped to one in four, a decline that Burke attributed to the closure of several lock hospitals. These establishments, he argued, forced the better class of prostitutes to flee. In contrast to the many officers and surgeons who declared that Indian prostitutes looked upon the hospitals with equanimity, if not apathy, Burke insisted that prostitutes loathed these "places of confinement and punishment", and that consequently not only did few women come to them voluntarily, but the periodic sweeps through the cantonments resulted only in the apprehension of the "poorer, the most wretched and probably the most harmless class of the diseased."80 Bentinck pushed this point further and questioned whether the staff at lock hospitals were competent to identify cases of venereal disease without "disgusting research such as must be extremely offensive to the more decent prostitutes"'.81 Burke's inquiries led him to conclude that most of the women who had hitherto been confined to the lock hospitals of the Bengal army were "generally from the burrah ["great", here referring to the main or central bazaar] bazaars, and not from the regimental bazaars, that is they were not of the class or number of females with whom the European troops had intercourse."82 This left soldiers with a choice: either they could seek out the ones left behind, who, Burke implied, would be the most destitute and therefore the most likely to be diseased, or they could set off in search of those prostitutes who had shifted their operations beyond the army's watchful eye, thereby exposing the men to other dangers. Burke warned that such travels risked "exposing [the soldiers] to all weathers, day and night, and thereby giving rise to fevers, dysentery, cholera, etc. Burke's attentions did not fall exclusively on the prostitute, for in what was a considerable departure from current thinking, he recommended that the army address infected soldiers, particularly when they refused to identify the prostitutes with whom they had intercourse. Burke advised stopping the soldier's ration of spirits in such situations. Soldiers should also be placed on more onerous duties following their discharge from hospital. While some officers did on their own initiative try to implement various punishments, they were generally unsuccessful, for such actions were usually in breach of military law. Burke's efforts to assign some of the responsibility for infection on the soldiers themselves (even if this was in a negative way) struck a responsive chord in Bentinck. Punitive actions against soldiers infected with venereal disease were, however, unacceptable to the British army, though such policies were well established in the French army.84 With this route blocked, Bentinck's attempts to combat the disease by acting on the soldier were limited to improving and extending the recreational opportunities open to the European rank and file. This strategy did not prove to be successful, though in fairness to Bentinck financial constraints and the delaying tactics employed by many regimental officers meant that his proposed reforms were only haphazardly applied.
The case in support of lock hospitals was also weakened when suspicions were cast upon those charged with maintaining and supervising them. In terms similar to those used to question the trustworthiness of Indian police, the conduct of the Indian matrons and peons who were responsible for identifying and securing diseased women was scrutinized and suspicions raised.85 It was widely rumoured that many women were confined in lock hospitals as a form of blackmail.86 Burke also insisted that native doctors could not be trusted, a sentiment widely shared by those on both sides of the lock hospital debate. Even the European surgeons were not exempt from suspicion as they were provided with allowances based on the number of women being treated.87 Burke concluded his report by insisting that "the lock hospitals in Bengal had completely failed in the object for which they were The difficulty of mobilizing support for the reopening of lock hospitals was considerably eased in the 1830s by the appearance in that decade of a growing number of professional publications through which army officers and medical surgeons could air their opinions.'°°The physical health, moral condition and efficiency of soldiers provided a site upon which these professional agendas could overlap, and venereal diseases were a frequent subject of articles and letters to the editors in both the military press and in the medical periodicals. Medical and military discourses were also more easily fused together in this period by the fact that sanitary approaches to disease, which many surgeons were drawn to in the absence of effective clinical treatments for such devastating illnesses as malaria, cholera and venereal diseases, were intellectually and culturally compatible with military culture. Discipline within the army was upheld by close surveillance backed up by the rapid application of authority: the same approach that lay at the heart of schemes of sanitary improvement. The popularity of such measures in the decades after 1830 is attested by the proliferation of medical topographical surveys. These emphasized that dangers to European health were everywhere, climate, water, miasma, or the temptations of local liquor and women. They often concluded that the surest way to protect Europeans from contagion was to limit their exposure. It is not a coincidence that one of the prime movers behind these medical topographies, Sir James Ranald Martin, would later play a key role in framing the 102 Rates of venereal infection in the army, however, did not register any appreciable decline. In Bengal, the officer commanding at Dinapore in the early 1830s chose to hire the matron of the now defunct lock hospital. In return for a small salary paid out of the canteen fund, she was to watch over those prostitutes who regularly numbered soldiers among their clients, and ensure that they were not diseased. She had no legal power to back her up, but failure to keep disease under control was to be met by a reduction to her salary.103 This system soon spread to other cantonments and was popularly known as the "old bawd" system. These "old bawds" mostly proved to be ineffective. Exasperation over their inability to control prostitutes persuaded some officers that the next best alternative was to monitor more closely their own troops. At Ghazipur in the 1830s, soldiers were subjected to weekly inspections, though there is no indication that those found to be infected were punished in any way.104 Nor would we expect this to be the case given that such a course of action would be likely to land its instigator in legal trouble.
The Lock hospitals in all but name began to reappear in Bombay and Madras in the 1840s and 1850s, first in the more isolated cantonments and then later in camps closer to the presidency capitals. At Secunderabad, the superintendent of cantonment police issued an order for a tax to be collected from all dancing girls and prostitutes, which would then be used to pay a matron to ensure their healthiness. The order also directed that any woman who deliberately concealed a sexually transmitted disease "shall be most severely punished", though the punishment was not specified.112 In this case, local officials had clearly overstepped the bounds. Such blatant deviation from official policy could not be ignored, and the offending officer was censured. Nevertheless, the Madras government was sufficiently convinced of the utility of lock hospitals to establish on a trial basis a lock hospital at Cannanore, though they were quick to reassure London that they had prohibited the use of "any measures of a compulsory nature."113 Such prohibitions were in vain, for it was later discovered that once infected soldiers had identified the woman from whom they believed they had contracted the disease, a guard of peons was sent to take her into custody, and she was forcibly detained until cured.114 When the Madras government ordered the surgeon at Cannanore not to use force in the future, he replied that the lock hospital would then have to be closed as few women would willingly come forward. The archival trail unfortunately ends at this point, though the few scattered references to the continued existence of a hospital for diseased women at Cannanore suggests that perhaps the government tacitly agreed to avert their gaze, provided the military authorities in the Officers of the Bengal establishment were simultaneously pushing for a return to something akin to the lock hospital system, though, owing to Bentinck's legacy, they were apparently less inclined to threaten publicly to subvert official policy. The surgeon at Meerut in 1839 pleaded for a lock hospital, noting his dissatisfaction with the present system of weekly inspections of the women in the bazaar. If any were found to be infected, they were only encouraged to seek treatment as out-patients, while those that were uninfected were issued with a ticket to that effect. 15 The commanding officer and senior surgeon at Ghazipur both recommended the re-establishment of a lock hospital in 1844 owing to the high rates of infection there. The government in Bengal disagreed, referring to Burke's memorandum as proof that lock hospitals did not address those prostitutes with whom most soldiers were likely to have intercourse.116 Yet mounting concerns for the health of the European soldiers meant that the official position against lock hospitals was beginning to waver even in Bengal.
London's response to pleas for the reintroduction of the lock hospitals, or for something along those lines, was ambiguous. While it continued to uphold the principle that compulsion should not be used, it did concede that "some deviation is occasionally admissible". The situation became even more fraught with contradictions when it coupled this to a warning that "the utmost discretion must be used in the application of anything partaking of the nature of constraint.",117 Once London's firm commitment to a noncoercive regime weakened, authorities in India began to rebuild slowly the lock hospital system, though this time they would have the added advantages of an increasingly comprehensive legal arsenal at their disposal. Lock hospitals were reintroduced on a temporary basis in some stations of the Madras army in 1855.118 After a survey of prostitutes in the sadr bazaar in one cantonment in 1859 revealed that twenty of the seventy-five examined were infected, an experimental lock hospital was reintroduced in
Bengal."19 Authorities in London approved this measure on a trial basis for one year.
Hence, even before the Contagious Diseases Acts were passed, and perhaps in the knowledge that such legislation was in the offing, the government of India had quietly gone to work reinventing the lock hospital.
Conclusion
The rise, fall and rise again of lock hospitals in India during the first half of the nineteenth century offers an excellent vantage point from which we can observe how medical thought and military imperatives were configured by colonial understandings of race, class and gender. Venereal diseases were as much a social problem as they were a medical condition. Contemporaries made little effort at separating the disease from its mode of transmission, which in the early nineteenth century was read as passing from woman to man. In India, it took a further twist as it was being transferred not only between the sexes, but also between races. Surgeons in India had early on become disenchanted with mercurial treatments, but they were also dissatisfied with alternative remedies. This failure to establish an effective strategy of medical intervention within the army prompted surgeons to agree with army officers that they would have to employ juridical methods to counter the putative carrier-the prostitute. Here we can see a parallel with the strategies being devised to deal with other "tropical" diseases like cholera. In these cases, as in that of venereal disease, the patient could not be easily or effectively treated, yet the carrier, once identified, could be isolated with the means available to the colonial regime, namely segregation and cordon sanitaires.
While this strategy of surveillance and control was not unique to India, it was certainly pushed with greater zeal because of the extent of the problem and the colonial context, which was employed to rationalize the draconian measures that such a strategy entailed. Military imperatives and medical policies in India were both part of a broader moral/cultural domain upon which were inscribed the prejudices and assumptions of a masculine colonial ideology. The fixation on the prostitute as the site for intervention was therefore underpinned by contemporary constructions of race and gender. The Indian prostitute, like India itself, was objectified and problematized in a way that would have been inconceivable had not colonial rule produced the types of cultural and scientific discourses that legitimated the belief in an inherent difference between India and Europe and between Indian prostitutes and European prostitutes.
From this perspective, the campaign to abolish the lock hospitals in the early 1830s can be viewed as an aberration, for it drew little support beyond that of the Governor-General and the Inspector General of Hospitals. Bentinck's grounds for abolition certainly rested on his moral objections to the coercion of prostitutes. He also hoped that a more enlightened and tolerant policy would lead to improvements in the condition of the rank and file and a more general willingness on the part of those Europeans and Indians afflicted with syphilis and gonorrhoea to submit themselves to western medical care. However, this position won little support in India, though it did carry the day in London. Medical and military officers in India, and especially in Madras and Bombay, bided their time, and surreptitiously began to reconstruct a system of regulated prostitution which ultimately would be given London's sanction in the form of the Contagious Diseases Acts.
